In Discipline and Punish, Foucault aims to “try to study the metamorphosis of punitive methods on the basis of a political technology of the body in which might be read a common history of power relations and object relations” (24). To do this, he opens his inquiry with a graphic description of the torture and execution of Damiens the regicide that demonstrates the type of public justice that has been replaced by the kind he is concerned with. Public punishment, he argues, has been replaced with an “abstract consciousness” and public trial (9), both of which wield a control role and have less hold on the body which, he notes, has become the intermediary in the the new “‘non-corporal’ penality” (11). In this new system, pain and spectacle are even removed from execution. He points to the improved technology of hanging, which kills someone instantly, to demonstrate this.
He further says that no longer is a criminal subjected to torture equal to that caused by his crime. The only torture remains that of deprivation, of the loss of liberty and rights. One is now either deprived of one’s rights or one’s right to exist. The change Foucault is describing is not only to the operational method; it is also to the object of the punishment. The new emphasis is on “judging something other than crimes, namely, the ‘soul’ of the criminal” (19). This means that the heart or soul is the object of punishment, and while crimes such as murder are still treated as criminal, it is the desires, drives, perversions, and intents that become the focus of judgement and object of change (17).
Important to this process is that the new punitive system is coterminous with a new system of knowledge and truth, or as Foucault says, “a corpus of knowledge, techniques, ‘scientific’ discourses is formed and becomes entangled with the practice of power to punish” (23). In trials, for example, an estimation of the criminal is attained through the testimony of psychiatrists and other advisors whose expertise discerns the accused’s conformance to expectations of action. Because of this new knowledge system and its employment in the punitive system, subjects receive an assessment of normality leading to a punishment aimed to be a “prescription for possible normalization” (21). In other words, the experts show how the accused is not in conformance to norms and morals and punishment is devised to bring him back into compliance with it. This system of judgement is not just a series of “‘negative’ mechanisms” however: it is inlaid in a collective whole with a “whole series of positive and useful effects” (24). The soul, Foucault claims, becomes constituted by these new methods of control and restraint. Power, then, is wielded not in blunt force but through its diffuse manifestation throughout all aspects of the social life.
Foucault makes a final telling point of the aim of his inquiry. He is “writing of the history of the present,” and in particular the historical context of the prison revolts he witnesses in his own time (31). He sees these physical revolts or revolts “of the body” as against “the body of the prison” or of the whole system that has controlled the prisoners. This point of resistance is central to Foucault, and he further emphasizes it in his article “The Subject and Power,” where he calls for analyzing resistance in order to understand the manifestations of rationalized control and advocates for “taking forms of resistance against different forms of power as a starting point” (780). He calls these entrenched struggles “agonisms,” which suggests a constant provocation between forces of power and resistances to them (790). In fact, he says, power only needs to be exerted as a totalizing force because freedom exists: without options and possibilities that can be realized, there is no need to attempt to dampen these possibilities. Foucault claims that this ultimately limits power because it opens up the possibility of it being overturned, but the struggle also provides power an opportunity to overcome the insubordination and reassert itself. Both need to be analyzed, Foucault concludes, because they expose aspects of each other.
The focus on resistance is an especially important point for anthropologists, and particularly those who study post-colonial societies. One can easily take colonial forces as a concrete demonstration of the totalizing force Foucault articulates. The strategy and effect of subordination of some colonizers has, in fact, been described this way by Comaroff and Comaroff in Ethnography and the Historical Imagination, where they demonstrate how the Tswana of South Africa were forced into a subjective role the Europeans both imagined and imposed (1993). They propose a dialectic of mutual creating of the Tswana and the colonials due to the encounter, something they call “the colonization of consciousness.” And while their analysis is not wholly Foucauldian, their formulation of the power-resistance dynamic in the cultural encounter seems to articulate Foucault’s point of their mutual independence quite well. Foucault’s focus upon resistance, therefore, is an important locus of analysis for such anthropological subjects because, as he says, the forms of resistance show both the nature of and the fissures in the body of power that is being resisted. An ethnographic description of such a resistance can thus portray the power system that is vital to the situations but often so abstract as to be resistant to depiction in ethnography.